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Admiralty
by John P. Kavanagh, Jr. *
The cases discussed herein represent decisions from the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, as well as district courts within
the Circuit, issued in 2020. While not an all-inclusive list of maritime
decisions during that timeframe, the Author identified and provided
summaries of key rulings of interest to the maritime practitioner. 1
I. CRUISE LINE PASSENGER CLAIMS
A passenger injured aboard the Carnival ship VALOR filed
simultaneous state and federal complaints. However, her eschewal of
federal jurisdiction—followed by an immediate motion to dismiss the
federal lawsuit based on lack of jurisdiction—did not impress the
Eleventh Circuit. 2 The court of appeals noted the plaintiff’s unique
approach to her personal injury claim: “This case comes before us in a
peculiar procedural posture, with DeRoy’s tacit invocation of federal
jurisdiction—by filing her complaint in the district court—coupled with
DeRoy’s explicit disavowal of federal jurisdiction in her allegations and
claim for relief.” 3 Rejecting these machinations, the court held that, when
admiralty jurisdiction exists based on the facts and substance of the
claims alleged, a plaintiff cannot disavow the existence of jurisdiction by
failing to specifically reference or acknowledge the same. 4
As noted above, two complaints were filed, the first in United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida, the underlying suit
herein, with a second lawsuit simultaneously filed in the Eleventh
* Partner in the firm of Burr & Forman LLP; Co-Chair of the firm's Transportation and
Maritime Practice Group. University of South Alabama (B.A., summa cum laude, 1989);
Tulane University School of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 1992). Member, Maritime Law
Association of the United States; Southeastern Admiralty Law Institute; Propeller Club
(Port of Mobile). Member, State Bars of Mississippi and Alabama.
1 For an analysis of admiralty law during the prior Survey period, see John P. Kavanagh,
Jr., Admiralty, Eleventh Circuit Survey, 71 MERCER L. REV. 913 (2020).
2 DeRoy v. Carnival Corp., 963 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir. 2020).
3 Id. at 1310.
4 Id. at 1313.
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Circuit Court in and for Miami-Dade County, Florida. Each complaint
contained a single negligence claim against Carnival, the owner and
operator of the M/V VALOR. 5
The Carnival ticket contract contained a forum selection clause,
requiring any suit to be filed in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida, “[I]f it was jurisdictionally possible to do
so[.]” 6 The clause states in pertinent part:
[I]t is agreed by and between the Guest and Carnival that all disputes
and matters whatsoever arising under, in connection with or incident
to this Contract or the Guest’s cruise, including travel to and from the
vessel, shall be litigated, if at all, before the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida in Miami, or as to those
lawsuits to which the Federal Courts of the United States lack subject
matter jurisdiction, before a court located in Miami-Dade County,
Florida, U.S.A. to the exclusion of the Courts of any other county, state
or country. 7

The federal lawsuit filed by Ms. DeRoy observed that diversity
jurisdiction did not exist, since both she and Carnival were citizens of
Florida. Her negligence-only complaint precluded federal-question
jurisdiction. 8 In an attempt to avoid admiralty jurisdiction, Ms. DeRoy
pled her in personam action “[A]t law, not in admiralty. So, DeRoy
concluded, admiralty jurisdiction did not exist, since admiralty
jurisdiction does not extend to in personam claims brought at law.” 9
The trial court determined that the “saving–to–suitors clause” of
28 U.S.C. § 1333 10 allowed the plaintiff to essentially plead around the
federal court’s admiralty jurisdiction. The plaintiff’s motion to dismiss
was granted. 11
The Eleventh Circuit rejected this position, and noted that an injury
to a passenger aboard a cruise ship “falls comfortably within the
admiralty jurisdiction of the district court . . . .” 12 Further, while the
plaintiff is the master of her complaint, the court is not bound by a party’s
wordsmithing: “[I]t is the facts and substance of the claims alleged, not
Id. at 1308.
Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 1310. See 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2021). § 1333 (1) provides, in part, that district
courts have original jurisdiction over “[a]ny civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction,
saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.”
11 Id. at 1309.
12 Id. at 1310.
5
6
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the jurisdictional labels attached, that ultimately determine whether a
court can hear a claim.” 13 Further, once it is established that the federal
court has jurisdiction, it has a duty to proceed with the case in its exercise
of that jurisdiction. 14
The court next dispensed with the suggestion that the plaintiff’s
failure to make an election under Rule 9(h) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 15 voided admiralty jurisdiction. 16 Rule 9(h) provides that a
claim cognizable only in admiralty or maritime jurisdiction is treated as
an admiralty or maritime claim whether or not an election is made. 17
Because Ms. DeRoy’s negligence claim fell only within the federal court’s
admiralty jurisdiction, the district court properly exercised admiralty
jurisdiction in the case whether DeRoy invoked it or not. 18
Likewise, the “savings-to-suitors” clause did not provide any escape
from federal jurisdiction. 19 The court discussed this in the context of the
right to jury trial, which is generally unavailable when a case proceeds
solely in admiralty. 20 In the instant case, however, this was not an issue
because Carnival agreed to a jury trial. 21
Finally, the court cited the language of the forum selection clause,
which unequivocally requires that suits be filed in the federal courts for
the Southern District of Florida. 22 The court rejected the suggestion that
the alternative language in the forum selection clause—allowing suit in
Florida state court if federal jurisdiction was not available—was an
“invitation for litigants to forum shop.” 23 “Litigants who wish to be in
state court cannot simply refuse to set forth the correct federal
jurisdictional ground. DeRoy’s construction would . . . effectively nullify
the forum-selection clause[.]” 24
The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s order of dismissal
and remanded the case for further proceedings soundly within the

Id. at 1311 (citing inter alia Taylor v. Appleton, 30 F.3d 1365, 1367 (11th Cir. 1994)).
DeRoy, 963 F.3d at 1311.
15 FED. R. CIV. P. 9(h).
16 Deroy, 963 F.3d at 1312.
17 Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 9(h)(1)).
18 Deroy, 963 F.3d at 1313.
19 Id. at 1314.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 1315–16.
23 Id. at 1316.
24 Id.
13
14
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confines of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida. 25
In a fairly cursory opinion, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the trial
court’s decision to dismiss a lawsuit brought by cruise ship passengers
when their trip was cancelled due to Hurricane Harvey. 26 A group of
passengers were slated to leave Galveston, Texas aboard a Royal
Caribbean vessel in August 2017. The approach of Hurricane Harvey
prompted cancellation of the cruise, although Royal Caribbean did not
make the final decision until the day the cruise was set to depart.
Plaintiffs were in Galveston and dealt with hurricane conditions upon
their arrival and during the subsequent stay. Suit was filed against Royal
Caribbean based on negligence and negligent infliction of emotional
distress. 27
The district court highlighted the failure of plaintiffs to identify any
harm suffered in the original complaint; leave was granted to amend. 28
The second effort was likewise faulty: “Though the amended complaint
added that each appellant suffered ‘physical and emotional damage,’ it
still failed to specify their individual physical and emotional injuries.” 29
The matter was dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. 30 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit agreed that the
failure of the individual appellants to specifically identify the physical or
emotional damage suffered rendered the complaint deficient under the
now familiar Iqbal standard. 31
The appellants also sought recovery for the expenses incurred by the
unexpected stay in Texas. These allegations of financial harm were
barred under the “economic-loss rule.” 32 As explained by the court, the
economic loss doctrine will not allow for recovery of economic losses
unrelated to physical damages. 33 “The appellants do not allege that their
25 Id. at 1317. The appellate court noted that the state court case was “essentially on
hold pending the outcome of the appeal.” Id. at 1308, n.6. A parallel case where plaintiff
also tried to circumvent federal jurisdiction via artful pleading was remanded shortly after
the DeRoy decision. See Appleby v. NCL (Bahamas), Ltd., 823 F. App’x 833 (11th Cir. 2020).
“Because Appleby’s claim ‘is capable of being pleaded to satisfy federal jurisdiction (and
was, in fact, pleaded that way), the claim must proceed, if at all, in federal court.’” Id. at
836 (quoting DeRoy, 963 F.3d at 1317).
26 Heinen v. Royal Caribbean Cruises LTD., 806 F. App’x. 847, 849 (11th Cir. 2020).
27 Id. at 848–49.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 849.
30 Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)).
31 Heinen, 806 F. App’x. at 849–50 (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
32 Id. at 850.
33 Id.
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out-of-pocket expenses stem from physical injury to their person or their
property—they allege purely economic losses stemming from the
additional time they spent in Texas.” 34
Sexual assaults aboard cruise ships continue to be a problem, and
lawsuits seeking damages for such illicit activities populated the dockets
of the south Florida courts. In two related decisions, the Southern
District of Florida addressed motions to dismiss claims involving assaults
against passengers. 35 In Doe v. Carnival Corp., 36 the mother of a
fifteen-year-old cruise passenger filed suit against Carnival Corporation
(vessel owner/operator) and Dufry Cruise Services, LLC (concessionaire
aboard ship), alleging that her child was sexually assaulted by two
employees of Dufry. The plaintiff alleged numerous counts against both
Carnival and Dufry, including a claim that Carnival was negligent in its
training and monitoring of the crew. Punitive damages were requested
in the complaint’s prayer for relief. 37
The court assessed the Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss under the familiar
Iqbal and Twombly standards. 38 To survive a motion to dismiss, the
complaint must state sufficient factual matter to be plausible on its face,
and contain “content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 39 The
plaintiff’s complaint was actually fairly detailed in its factual allegations
concerning negligent training and supervision of the alleged attackers. 40
However, the allegations were leveled against Carnival, not the
employer: “Plaintiff does not explain how Carnival, rather than Dufry,
was supposed to train and monitor its non-employees.” 41 Based on this,
the court held that the plaintiff’s negligent training and negligent
monitoring claims against Carnival were due to be dismissed. 42
With respect to punitive damages, the district court surveyed the
current jurisprudence in the Eleventh Circuit, which still finds as its

Id.
See Doe v. Carnival, 470 F. Supp. 3d 1317 (S.D. Fla. 2020); see also Doe v. Carnival
Corp., 472 F. Supp. 3d 1187 (S.D. Fla. 2020).
36 470 F. Supp. 3d at 1317.
37 Id. at 1320–22.
38 Id. at 1322 (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 662; Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007)).
39 Doe, 470 F. Supp. 3d at 1322 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544).
40 See id. at 1321–22.
41 Id. at 1325.
42 Id.
34
35
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touchtone the Amtrak 43 decision. 44 Based on Amtrak and its progeny, the
district court agreed that punitive damages are available in exceptional
circumstances, such as intentional misconduct. 45 Accordingly, the motion
to dismiss punitive damages was denied, as the allegations of sexual
assault upon a minor, if proved, certainly qualify as exceptional
circumstances. 46
The second published decision addressed similar motions to dismiss
filed by the co-defendant, Dufry. 47 Recall that Dufry was a contract
vendor aboard the Carnival vessel, and its employees were the alleged
attackers of the minor victim. The plaintiff’s complaint alleged that
Dufry was strictly liable for the actions of its employees, relying on
Eleventh Circuit precedent. 48 In Doe v. Celebrity Cruises, 49 a passenger
was raped by a crewmember. 50 The Eleventh Circuit held that a cruise
line, as a common carrier, is strictly liable for crewmember assaults on
passengers during transit. 51 Dufry argued that, as a contract vendor, it
should not be treated as a common carrier and held to the strict liability
standard. 52 The district court disagreed, citing case law holding that
strict liability logically should extend to concessionaires whose employees
work aboard cruise vessels. 53
The collapse of a chair in a ship’s cabin resulted in a negligence case
of first impression involving res ipsa loquitur. 54 Irina Tesoriero was a
passenger aboard a Carnival cruise ship. Attempting to sit in the vanity
chair in her cabin, it collapsed resulting in an injury to her arm. Ms.
Tesoriero reported the accident to the ship’s crew. A cabin steward took
the chair away and replaced it with a new one. Her arm continued to
bother her, and Ms. Tesoriero incurred additional medical treatment,
costs and expenses once she returned home. Suit was eventually filed in
43 Altosino v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co. (In re Amtrak “Sunset Limited” Train
Crash Bayou Canot v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation, Co.), 121 F.3d 1421 (11th Cir. 1997).
44 Id. at 1325–26.
45 Doe, 470 F. Supp. 3d at 1326.
46 Id.
47 Doe v. Carnival Corp., 472 F. Supp. 3d at 1187.
48 Id. at 1192 (citing Doe v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 394 F.3d 891 (11th Cir. 2004)).
49 349 F.3d at 913.
50 Id. at 893.
51 Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 394 F.3d at 914 (cited in Doe, 472 F. Supp. 3d at 1191–92).
52 Doe, 472 F. Supp. 3d at 1192–93.
53 Id. (citing and quoting Doe (T.C.) v. Celebrity Cruise, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 3d 1109, 1117–
18 (S.D. Fla. 2019)) (“To hold otherwise would permit common carriers to effectively
eliminate its [sic] duty to protect passengers from the intentional torts of its crewmembers
through the use of creative, carefully-drafted contractor and subcontractor agreements.”).
54 Tesoriero v. Carnival Corp., 965 F.3d 1170 (11th Cir. 2020).
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the Southern District of Florida, asserting a single count of negligence
against Carnival and alleging that the company failed to inspect and
maintain the cabin furniture, or warn Ms. Tesoriero of the dangers
associated therewith. Summary judgment was granted in favor of the
vessel owner/operator, however, because the plaintiff failed to present
evidence that Carnival had notice that the chair was dangerous.
Likewise, the court held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not
absolve the plaintiff’s obligation to show notice. Finally, the district court
declined to sanction Carnival based on the fact that the chair was
disposed of after the accident. 55
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. 56 The controlling issue was
whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur relieves a plaintiff from
the obligation to show actual or constructive notice of the risk-creating
condition. 57 It is well settled that the cruise line is not an insurer of its
passenger’s safety and is responsible only for injuries caused by its
negligence. 58 As a prerequisite for imposing liability, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the vessel knew or should have known of the danger. 59
Notice of the problem can be actual or constructive. 60
In the instant case, it was undisputed that the chair did not have any
obvious defect. Testimony from the plaintiff’s husband, as well as
photographs he took after the accident, demonstrated this fact. Likewise,
Carnival produced evidence that its cleaning crew regularly moves chairs
and other furniture about the cabin, and would have noticed any defect
during such activity. 61
Effectively conceding the lack of notice, the plaintiff’s claim hinged on
the application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. 62 The plaintiff argued
that, even if she is unable to show Carnival had notice of the chair’s
defective condition, “[T]he cruise line can still be held liable under that
doctrine because it eliminates the usual notice requirement.” 63
As explained by the Eleventh Circuit, “Res ipsa loquitur—Latin for
‘the thing speaks for itself’—is an evidentiary doctrine that permits a
trier of fact to infer a defendant's negligence from unexplained

Id. at 1174–75.
Id. at 1175.
57 Id. at 1178.
58 Id. (quoting Keefe v. Bahama Cruise Line, Inc., 867 F.2d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 1989)).
59 Tesoriero, 965 F.3d at 1178.
60 Id. at 1178–79.
61 Id. at 1179–80.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 1180.
55
56
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circumstances.” 64 It is a form of circumstantial evidence, which allows an
injured party to demonstrate breach of a duty. 65 Importantly, however,
the doctrine “cannot show that a defendant must have had that duty in
the first place.” 66
In reviewing jurisprudence on the issue—and the split amongst
district courts within the Eleventh Circuit—the court opined that res ipsa
loquitur does not allow for the imposition of liability without fault, nor
does it actually establish a duty of care in the first instance. 67 “That
means the doctrine does not apply unless the alleged negligence is ‘within
the scope of the defendant's duty to the plaintiff.’” 68
The negligence analysis flows from the duty owed to passengers, which
is one of ordinary reasonable care under the circumstances. 69 As a
prerequisite to imposing liability, the vessel owner must have had actual
or constructive notice of the dangerous condition. 70 Stripped to its
essence, the obligation of demonstrating a duty vis-à-vis the plaintiff is
not impacted by the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. 71
In sum, a plaintiff who relies on res ipsa loquitur to show a breach of
duty still bears the burden of proving that a duty existed in the first
place. And because notice is an integral part of duty, a passenger who
relies on res ipsa loquitur bears the burden of showing that the cruise
line had notice. 72

The court of appeals likewise disposed of the plaintiff’s request for
sanctions because the cruise line threw out the chair. 73 Spoliation
sanctions, including adverse inferences arising therefrom, are imposed
only if the party’s failure to preserve evidence is premised in bad faith. 74
In the instant case, the chair was disposed of in the normal course of
business and no request was made to Carnival to preserve the chair. 75
The onboard medical department did not report Ms. Tesoriero’s accident

Id. (citing Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U.S. 233, 238–39 (1913)).
Tesoriero, 965 F.3d at 1180.
66 Id. at 1182.
67 Tesoriero, 965 F.3d at 1181.
68 Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328D (Am. Law Inst. 1965)).
69 Tesoriero, 965 F.3d at 1182.
70 Id. (citing Keefe, 867 F.2d at 1322).
71 Tesoriero, 965 F.3d at 1183.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 1183–84.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 1185–86.
64
65
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to security, classifying it as “non-reportable” because she was treated
with only basic first aid. 76
Circuit Judge Robin Rosenbaum issued a fairly lengthy and somewhat
hostile dissent, suggesting that Carnival “destroyed the chair that caused
Tesoriero’s injuries.” 77 Circuit Judge Rosenbaum believed fact questions
existed as to the bad faith issue and spoilation, making summary
judgment inappropriate. 78
II. SHIPOWNER’S LIMITATION OF LIABILITY
There seems to be an annual reminder of the inherent conflict between
vessel owners’ rights under the Limitation of Liability Act, 79 and the
“savings-to-suitors clause.” 80 This year’s reminder is found in the
decision In re Freedom Unlimited. 81 Mr. Joshua Bonn was a deckhand
employed aboard the M/Y FREEDOM, a large motor yacht owned and
operated by Freedom Unlimited. Mr. Bonn was injured while the M/Y
FREEDOM was undergoing repairs at a boatyard in south Florida. Bonn
filed suit in state court against Freedom Unlimited and the owner of the
boatyard, Taylor Lane Yacht and Ship Repair (Taylor Lane). 82
The owner of the M/Y FREEDOM filed a limitation action, seeking the
usual injunction against state court proceedings, and admonished all
potential claimants to file claims in the federal limitation action. Mr.
Bonn asserted claims of Jones Act negligence and unseaworthiness in the
limitation action; Taylor Lane filed claims against the vessel owner for
contractual indemnification as well as attorney’s fees. The magistrate
recommended that the injunction be lifted, allowing Mr. Bonn to pursue
his claims in state court. Because Freedom Unlimited objected, the
district court reviewed the magistrate’s decision on a de novo basis. 83
The personal injury claimant, Mr. Bonn, filed the stipulations
necessary to protect the vessel owner’s rights under the Limitation Act. 84
Here, the issue was whether or not the claims by the boatyard for
contractual indemnification and attorney’s fee turned a single claimant

Id.
Id. at 1187 (Rosenbaum, J., dissenting).
78 Id. at 1197–98.
79 46 U.S.C. § 30505(a)–(b)(2021).
80 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1)(2021).
81 440 F. Supp. 3d 1332 (S.D. Fla. 2020).
82 Id. at 1334.
83 Id. at 1334–35 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(3)).
84 440 F. Supp. 3d at 1336, 1343–44. The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Beiswenger
Enter. Corp. v. Carletta, approved the claimant’s stipulations which have become the de
facto standard. 86 F.3d 1032 (11th Cir. 1996).
76
77
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situation into a multiple–claimant–inadequate–fund case. 85 In that
instance, “courts have not allowed damage claimants to try liability and
damages issues in their chosen fora, even if they agree to return to the
admiralty court to litigate the vessel owner’s privity or knowledge.” 86
The district court made quick work of the contract-based
indemnification claim advanced by the shipyard. 87 Contract claims are
not subject to limitation because their obligations clearly arise with the
owner’s “privity or knowledge.” 88 The personal contract exception to a
limitation action is well established and reflects the purpose of the act to
“limit the shipowner’s liability for matters beyond his control. A personal
contract is obviously within the control of the ship owner.” 89
The claim for attorney’s fees was closer, as these would be over–and–
above whatever judgment a claimant might obtain. 90 Consequently, the
district court agreed with Freedom Unlimited that, on their face, the
protective stipulations would be inadequate to protect the vessel owner
(that is, the possibility exists that the combination of attorney’s fees and
an indemnity obligation would exceed the value of the vessel). 91 The
Eleventh Circuit has not spoken directly on this issue; specifically,
whether or not contractual attorney’s fees might create a
multiple-claimant, inadequate-fund situation. 92 However, because the
attorney’s fees claim arises from a personal contract of the ship owner,
this warrants their exclusion from consideration or protection under the
Limitation Act. 93 Based on the foregoing, the district court agreed to lift
the injunction, stay the federal limitation action, and permit the injured
deckhand to pursue his claims in state court. 94
In a later opinion, the district court rejected efforts by the vessel owner
to stay enforcement of its decision pending an appeal to the Eleventh
Circuit. 95 Rule 62 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 96 does allow the
district court to stay a lawsuit pending appeal of an interlocutory
In re Freedom Limited, 440 F. Supp. 3d at 1336.
Id.
87 Id. at 1339.
88 Id. (citing inter alia Richardson v. Harmon, 222 U.S. 96, 102 (1911)).
89 In re Freedom Limited, 440 F. Supp. 3d at 1343 (citing S & E Shipping Corp. v.
Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co., 678 F.2d 636, 645, n. 14 (6th Cir. 1982)).
90 In re Freedom Limited, 440 F. Supp. 3d at 1339.
91 Id. at 1339–40.
92 Id. at 1340.
93 Id. at 1341–43.
94 Id. at 1345.
95 In re Freedom Unlimited, 489 F. Supp.3d 1328, 1333 (S.D. Fla. 2020).
96 FED. R. CIV. P. 62(c).
85
86
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decision. 97 However, the party seeking a stay bears a “heavy burden,”
seeking this “extraordinary relief.” 98
The movant must establish four factors in order to obtain a stay
pending appeal: “(1) [S]ubstantial likelihood that they will prevail on the
merits of the appeal; (2) a substantial risk of irreparable injury . . . ; (3)
no substantial harm to the other interested persons; and (4) no harm to
the public interest.” 99 Relying heavily on the determination that personal
contracts are not subject to limitation, the district court concluded that
Freedom Unlimited was unlikely to prevail on the merits of its appeal. 100
Accordingly, the request to stay was denied. 101
III. MARINE INSURANCE
The Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed that the doctrine of uberrimae fidei is
alive and well in the context of marine insurance. 102 Mr. Quintero owned
a thirty-two foot powerboat which he kept at this home, parked in the
driveway when not in use. The vessel was insured by Geico, under a
policy that ran from May 5, 2017 to May 5, 2018. Geico sent a reminder
indicating that the policy would expire on May 5, 2018. On May 4, 2018,
Mr. Quintero called Geico to complain about an increase in premium,
indicating that he was going to find a new insurance company. 103 When
he did not make the required renewal payment prior to the May 5, 2018,
deadline, Geico sent a “Notice of Policy Expiration,” confirming that the
marine insurance policy expired on May 5, 2018, and that “all liability
thereunder terminated on its expiration date.” 104
Unfortunately, in the pre-dawn hours of May 25, 2018, Mr. Quintero’s
vessel was stolen from his driveway. Mr. Quintero placed a call to Geico
that same morning seeking to reinstate his marine insurance policy. The
Geico representative asked a series of questions, and Mr. Quintero
answered in the affirmative that his vessel was sound and seaworthy,
and otherwise remained in his possession. The policy was reissued, with
coverage backdated to May 5, 2018. 105

FED. R. CIV. P. 62(c) (quoted in In re Freedom Unlimited, 489 F. Supp. 3d at 1331–32).
489 F.Supp. 3d at 1331–32 (internal citations omitted).
99 Id. (citing and quoting Touchston v. McDermott, 234 F.3d 1130, 1132 (11th Cir. 2000)).
100 In re Freedom Unlimited, 489 F. Supp. 3d at 1132–33.
101 Id. at 1140.
102 Quintero v. Geico Marine Insurance Co., 983 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 2020).
103 Id. at 1267.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 1267–68.
97
98
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Later that afternoon (May 25, 2018), Mr. Quintero reported that his
boat was stolen. Shortly thereafter, he also called Geico to make a claim
for the stolen boat and trailer. Geico investigated and ultimately
discovered the ruse. The claim for loss was denied. 106
Mr. Quintero filed suit against Geico claiming a breach of the policy of
insurance. The case was removed to federal court, where the district
judge granted Geico’s motion for summary judgment. On appeal, Mr.
Quintero argued that the district court erred in applying the doctrine of
uberrimae fidei because (1) the policy was not cancelled or expired when
he obtained coverage on May 25, 2018; (2) his coverage continued in full
force without a lapse; and (3) the statements made following the theft of
his vessel were not material to Geico's decision to continue insurance on
the vessel. 107
The doctrine of uberrimae fidei 108 applies to marine insurance
contracts and embodies the “highest degree of good faith.” 109 Essentially,
the doctrine requires an insured to act with the utmost good faith in its
dealings with his or her marine insurance company, largely because the
underwriters “often cannot ensure the accuracy or sufficiency of the facts
supplied” before accepting the risk. 110 Violation of the obligation will
allow the insurance company to void the policy ab inito. 111 This is the
case even if the misrepresentations are the result of a mistake, accident
or forgetfulness, or if the insurance company “did not inquire about the
particular material fact that its insured failed to disclose.” 112

Id. at 1268.
Id. at 1268–69.
108 The doctrine of uberrimae fidei was long thought to be an entrenched precedent in
the general maritime law. See, e.g., Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, London v. Inlet
Fisheries, Inc., 518 F.3d 645, 651 (9th Cir. 2008). A sea change was announced by the Fifth
Circuit in its 1991 decision of Albany Ins. Co. v. Anh Thi Kieu. 927 F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1991).
The Albany Ins. Co. decision has been subject to criticism and appears to stand alone
amongst the circuits which have considered the issue. See Great Lakes Reinsurance (UK)
PLC v. Durham Auctions, Inc., 583 F.3d 236, 241 (5th Cir. 2009); see also John P. Kavanagh,
Jr.,“‘Ask Me No Questions and I’ll Tell You No Lies’: The Doctrine of Uberrimae Fidei in
Marine Insurance Transactions,” 17 TUL. MAR. L.J. 37 (Fall 1992). For present purposes, it
is sufficient to note that the Eleventh Circuit continues its adherence and application of the
uberrimae fidei doctrine. See HIH Marine Servs., Inc. v. Fraser, 211 F.3d 1359, 1362 (11th
Cir. 2000) (“It is well-settled that the marine insurance doctrine of uberrimae fidei is the
controlling law of this circuit.”).
109 Quintero, 983 F.3d at 1271 (quoting Steelmet, Inc. v. Caribe Towing Corp., 747 F.2d
689, 695 (11th Cir. 1984), vacated in part, 779 F.2d 1485 (11th Cir. 1986)).
110 Quintero, 983 F.3d at 1271.
111 Id.
112 Id. (citing HIH Marine Servs., Inc. v. Fraser, 211 F.3d 1359, 1362–63 (11th Cir.
2000)).
106
107
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The Eleventh Circuit quickly disposed of Mr. Quintero’s arguments
and rejected his efforts to establish coverage for his stolen vessel. 113 First,
while it is true the doctrine of uberrimae fidei only applies when a policy
is issued—as opposed to one already in force—Mr. Quintero’s policy was
not in force on May 25th because it expired on May 5, 2018. 114
Alternatively, Mr. Quintero argued his statements were not material
to Geico’s decision to reinstate coverage. 115 This idea was rejected; the
materiality of the insured’s statements must be viewed “from the
perspective of a reasonable insurer.” 116 As explained by the Eleventh
Circuit, when Mr. Quintero made the call to reinstate coverage on May
25, 2018, his boat had already been missing for over two and a half
hours. 117 “Quintero had a duty to disclose that fact even if Geico did not
directly ask him.” 118 Even giving him the benefit of the doubt, the
Eleventh Circuit held that Mr. Quintero’s knowledge about the location
of his boat was a fact clearly within his knowledge and was undoubtedly
material to Geico’s decision to issue marine insurance. 119
In National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, P.A v. Vinardell Power
Systems, Inc. 120, the district court was called upon to interpret a cargo
insurance policy following damage to electrical equipment shipped from
Miami, Florida to El Salvador. Twenty-five large circuit breakers owned
by Vinardell Power Systems were shipped in open top containers on the
deck of two different vessels. The cargo was damaged by water, although
a dispute existed over whether it was rainwater from a pre-voyage storm
in Florida, or damage caused by water during transit. This was not the
dispositive issue for the court’s attention, however. 121 Rather, “the only
issue now pending before the Court is what type of insurance coverage
applies should the Court find, at trial, that the insurance policy
attaches.” 122
The policy at issue was an “all risk” policy. Different documents
actually comprised the policy and described coverage thereunder,
including a certificate which incorporated by reference a number of
Quintero, 983 F.3d at 1271.
Id.
115 Id. at 1272.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id. (“An insured's possession of the subject property is clearly material to the insurer's
risk in insuring it, and we agree with the district court's commonsense observation that
‘insuring a stolen Vessel is akin to insuring a loss.’”).
120 2020 WL 1307192 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 19, 2020).
121 Id. at *2.
122 Id. at *6.
113
114
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endorsements. One of the endorsements required application of the
“German General Rules of Marine Insurance.” 123 In pertinent part, the
German Rules limit coverage for deck cargo: “The policy states that ‘[f]or
goods loaded on deck with the consent of the Insured, Stranding cover
only shall apply.’” 124 It appears from the text of the opinion that the
stranding coverage is a more discreet and limited form of coverage,
providing insurance for certain enumerated risks of which water damage
is not included. 125
The court ultimately concluded that stranding coverage applied,
despite the cargo owner’s suggestion of ambiguity, and that the terms of
the certificate alone should control. 126 Of particular interest for the
reader is the court’s heavy reliance on cases interpreting “all risk”
homeowner’s insurance policies. 127 As a preliminary matter, the court
turned to Florida law, noting that federal courts “routinely apply Florida
law to govern the manner of interpretation of a maritime contract.” 128
Pursuant to Florida law, the court looks at the text of the policy and
construes the plain language of the contract. 129 The policy must be read
as a whole, with an effort to give meaning to each component part of the
policy. 130 Finally, if the policy language is susceptible to more than one
reasonable interpretation, the court will employ the interpretation which
provides for coverage. This is the case, however, “[o]nly when a genuine
inconsistency, uncertainty, or ambiguity in meaning remains after resort
to ordinary rules of construction[.]” 131
The court then drew an analogy between homeowner’s insurance
policies in Florida and the marine policy at issue herein. 132 Both are “all
risk” contracts, giving with one hand and taking with another (namely,
in the exclusions contained in the policy itself). 133 “The uncanny
resemblance between this maritime cargo insurance contract and that of
a homeowner's all-risk insurance contract cannot be overstated.” 134
Id. at *3.
Id. at *5.
125 Id. at *4.
126 Id. at *10.
127 Id. at *14–15.
128 Id. at *10 (citing Geico Marine Ins. Co. v. Shackleford, 945 F.3d 1135, 1139–40 (11th
Cir. 2019)).
129 National Union Fire Ins. Co., 2020 WL 1307192, at *10.
130 Id. at *10–11.
131 Id. at *11 (quoting Swire Pac. Holdings, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 845 So. 2d 161, 165
(Fla. 2003).
132 National Union Fire Ins. Co., 2020 WL 1307192, at *12.
133 Id. at *12.
134 Id. at *15.
123
124
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Employing the accepted rules of interpretation for homeowner’s policies
in Florida, the court concluded the instant marine policy provided only
for standing coverage, again, which appears to be a more limited form of
insurance available to the loss at issue. 135
IV. MARITIME DAMAGES (MEDICAL EXPENSES)
In a case of first impression, the Eleventh Circuit held that the
“appropriate measure of medical damages in a maritime tort case is that
reasonable value determined by the jury upon consideration of any
relevant evidence, including the amount billed, the amount paid, and any
expert testimony and other relevant evidence the parties may offer.” 136
Joyce Higgs was injured while on a Caribbean cruise with her family in
2014. She tripped over a cleaning bucket, sustaining serious injuries to
her shoulder. Suit was filed in the Southern District of Florida, alleging
negligence under Federal Maritime Law. The lawsuit had a fairly lengthy
shelf life, including a trial, appeal, reversal, and a second trial. While
interesting, the procedural posture of the case is not relevant to the
damage issue. 137
The jury returned a significant verdict for Ms. Higgs, awarding
$650,000.00 in “past general damages,” $500,000.00 in future general
damages, and $61,000.00 in past medical expenses. The district court
reduced the award of medical expenses to $16,326.01, the amount
actually paid by Plaintiff and her insurance company (United Health
Care). 138
Anyone who has reviewed EOB (“Explanation of Benefits”) forms
knows that the amount health care providers charge is drastically
different than the amount actually paid by a health insurance company.
Ms. Higgs’ case is a prime example. The various medical providers
charged $57,799.41 for care and treatment provided, while Ms. Higgs
paid $350.00 in co-pays. United Health Care, however, pursuant to its
contracts with the doctors, hospitals, and so forth, paid only a fraction of
that amount ($12,313.67) in total satisfaction of the charges. The balance
was “written off,” never to be paid by anyone. 139 Indeed, the court
described this “reality of the contemporary healthcare market,” in which

Id. at *18–19.
Higgs v. Costa Crociere S.P.A. Co., 969 F.3d 1295, 1299 (11th Cir. 2020).
137 Id. at 1299.
138 Id. at 1302.
139 Id. at 1308–09.
135
136
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providers “bill arbitrarily large amounts with the knowledge and
expectation that no one will ever be required to pay so high of a figure.” 140
The Eleventh Circuit’s analysis was guided by the principle that
plaintiffs are entitled to recover the “reasonable value of treatment for
injuries they have sustained, regardless of whether their medical
expenses have been paid and by whom.” 141 What then, is the “reasonable
value of treatment?” Is it the inflated values on a hospital bill? Or is it
the steeply discounted prices paid pursuant to whatever contractual
arrangements the insurance companies have with providers? 142 The
court rejected the idea that either one of these measures sufficed as the
best approximation of “reasonable value” for healthcare services. 143
In view of this, the court refused to “impose a bright-line rule for the
calculation of damages.” 144 In the absence of any legislative direction, the
court held that it is incumbent upon the jury to determine the reasonable
value of medical services received by a plaintiff in any given case, taking
into consideration “all relevant evidence, notably including the amount
billed, the amount paid, and any expert testimony and other relevant
evidence the parties may offer.” 145 In concluding its analysis, the court
recognized two principle arguments against this approach, both arising
out of the collateral source rule. 146 First, it was noted the collateral source
rule plays two roles: “A substantive one, which prohibits the reduction of
a plaintiff’s damages by amounts paid by a third party; and an
evidentiary one, which prohibits admission of evidence that a third-party
payment was made in compensation of a plaintiff’s injuries.” 147 The first
recognized criticism is that write-offs of unpaid charges can be seen as a
collateral payment of sorts. 148 Again, the court referenced the fictional
nature of the inflated medical bills which generally present “’an amount
that never was and never will be paid.’” 149 The court further noted that
the evidence of amount actually paid is certainly probative of the value
of services provided. 150 “The evidentiary role of the collateral source rule

Id. at 1315 (citing Kenney v. Liston, 233 W. Va. 620 (2014) (Loughry, J., dissenting)).
Higgs, 969 F.3d at 1311 (citing inter alia Restatement (Second) of Torts § 924 (1979)).
142 Id.
143 Id. at 1311–13.
144 Id. at 1313.
145 Id. at 1313–14.
146 Id. at 1314.
147 Id. (citing Bourque v. Diamond M. Drilling Co., 623 F.2d 351, 354 (5th Cir. 1980)).
148 Id.
149 Id. at 1315 (quoting John Dewar Gleissner, Proving Medical Expenses: Time for a
Change, 28 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 649, 656 (2005)).
150 Id.
140
141
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was never intended to shield the jury from highly probative evidence of
this kind.” 151
The second criticism addressed the evidentiary aspect of the collateral
source rule; that is, injecting the fact of the plaintiff’s insurance into the
trial and alerting the jury that a third-party made payments to
compensate the plaintiff’s injuries. 152 The court of appeals noted that the
district court could redact or omit the fact of who paid the bills, and
simply place into evidence the amounts paid. 153
Having addressed these putative criticisms, the Eleventh Circuit
restated its position—again a matter of first impression—that “the
appropriate measure of past medical expense damages in a maritime tort
case is the amount determined to be reasonable by the jury upon its
consideration of all relevant evidence, including the amount billed, the
amount paid, and any expert testimony and other relevant evidence the
parties may offer.” 154
V. ARBITRATION OF SEAFARER’S CLAIMS
The previous Eleventh Circuit Admiralty Survey cataloged the court’s
continued willingness to enforce arbitration clauses in seaman’s
employment contracts. 155 The decision in Sisca v. Hal Maritime, Ltd., 156
is a variation on that theme. Moreover, the case is a cautionary tale that
should prompt counsel for vessel operators and cruise lines to revisit the
terms of employment contracts. 157
The plaintiff Antonio Sisca, an Italian national, was employed as a
“cast member” aboard the M/V VENDAAM. 158 Mr. Sisca’s employment
contract was executed with the defendant, Hal Maritime, Ltd. The M/V
VENDAAM, however, was a vessel owned and operated by Princess
Cruise Lines, Ltd. Princess Cruise Lines was not a signatory to the
plaintiff’s employment contract, a critical fact in the proceedings. 159
Mr. Sisca’s employment contract with Hal commenced on July 26,
2019, and expired on April 22, 2020. However, on March 14, 2020, the
United States announced a “no sail order” for cruise ships due to the
Id.
Id. at 1316.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 1317.
155 John P. Kavanagh, Jr. Admiralty, Eleventh Circuit Survey, 71 MERCER L.REV. 913,
926–928 (2020).
156 2020 WL 6581608 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 10, 2020).
157 Id.
158 Id. at *2.
159 Id. at *6–7.
151
152
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COVID-19 pandemic. Mr. Sisca was unable to disembark from the M/V
VENDAAM until April 23, 2020, the day after his employment contract
expired. On April 23, 2020, Mr. Sisca and other crewmembers from the
M/V VENDAAM were transferred to another Princess vessel (REGAL
PRINCESS) by use of lifeboats. While on the lifeboat, Mr. Sisca slipped
and fell due to rough sea conditions. He injured his back, and later
underwent surgery but was left a paraplegic as a result of his injury. 160
Sisca filed a complaint in Florida state court. The defendants, Hal
Maritime and Princess Cruise Lines, removed the case to federal court
and sought to compel arbitration of Mr. Sisca’s claims. The defendants
relied on the terms of Sisca’s “Seagoing Employment Agreement.” The
agreement directed that all disputes arising out of Sisca’s service on
board a ship would be governed by the law specified in the applicable
Collective Bargaining Agreement. Further, the agreement required that
all claims be resolved by binding arbitration pursuant to the United
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards (New York 1958). 161 The statutory mechanism by which
the United States enforces the Convention’s terms is the Federal
Arbitron Act. 162
In addressing a motion to compel arbitration, the threshold question
is whether or not the parties agreed to arbitrate in the first instance. As
noted above, Princess Cruise Lines was not a signatory to the plaintiff’s
Seagoing Employment Agreement, the document which contained the
necessary arbitration clause. 163 Princess Cruise Lines argued that it was
a “sister company” of Hal (a signatory to the Seagoing Employment
Agreement) and that both corporations were owned by Carnival
Corporation. 164
Left without a written arbitration agreement executed with the
plaintiff, Princess Cruise Lines had to bootstrap itself into the agreement
signed with Hal Maritime and argue that Mr. Sisca was equitably
estopped from disavowing the arbitration provision in his Seagoing
Employment Agreement with Hal Maritime. Essentially, Princess was
arguing that the plaintiff was trying to have his cake and eat it too; he
was relying on the Seagoing Employment Agreement to provide seaman’s
status and invoke Jones Act, unseaworthiness, and maintenance and

Id. at *2–3.
Id. at *4–5. In Sisca’s case, the law of the British Virgin Islands would apply. 21
U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3.
162 Sisca, 2020 WL 6581608, at *8 (citing 9 U.S.C. §§ 201–208).
163 Id. at *7–8.
164 Id. at *11.
160
161
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cure claims, while simultaneously repudiating the arbitration clause. 165
In this case, the equitable estoppel issue would have been controlled by
British Virgin Island law. 166 Evidently, Princess did not make any
showing that British Virgin Island law “recognizes the equitable estoppel
doctrine in this context, much less that it would apply in Princess’
favor.” 167 Accordingly, without a written agreement—and left without an
equitable estoppel argument—Princess Cruise Lines’ motion to compel
arbitration was denied. 168
As to Hal Maritime, the court agreed that the plaintiff’s claims against
it were subject to arbitration. 169 Even though Mr. Sisca’s injury arose
after the Seagoing Employment Agreement expired, the agreement was
clearly broad enough to encompass any and all claims arising out of the
employment relationship. 170 Relying on the “but for” test used by the
Eleventh Circuit, the district court held that Sisca’s claim would be
subject to arbitration “even where the dispute allegedly arises after the
seaman's employment terminates.” 171
In another cautionary tale for future handling of seaman’s
employment agreements, the Eleventh Circuit remanded a foreign
seaman’s Jones Act and general maritime law claim to state court with
its decision in Hodgson v. Seven Seas Cruises. 172 The plaintiff, Sambola
Hodgson, a citizen of Nicaragua, was employed as a seaman on a vessel
owned by Voyager Vessel Company. The ship was operated by Seven Seas
Cruises (Regent). Mr. Hodgson was injured, and filed suit in state court,
asserting claims under the Jones Act and general maritime law.
Defendants removed the case to federal court and sought to compel
arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act. 173 The plaintiff
moved to remand the case to state court, arguing that his claims did not
relate to a valid arbitration agreement governed by the Federal
Arbitration Act or the New York Convention. 174
Id.
Id. at *12–13 (citing Lawson v. Life of the S. Ins. Co., 648 F.3d 1166, 1170 (11th Cir.
2011)).
167 Id. at *14.
168 Id.
169 Id. at *15.
170 Id. at *18.
171 Id. (citing Montero v. Carnival Corp., 523 F. App'x 623, 627–28 (11th Cir. 2013)). The
test asks whether or not the subject claims would be viable “but for” the seaman’s service
on a vessel. Id.
172 2020 WL 6120478, *1, 14–15 (11th Cir. Mar. 27, 2020).
173 Id. at *2–3 (citing 9 U.S.C. §§ 201–208 (2021)).
174 Id. at *5 (citing United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3.).
165
166
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The notice of removal contained two agreements with arbitration
provisions: (1) The employment contract (Crew Agreement), signed by
the plaintiff and a third-party staffing company (Seven Seas Services
Limited), and (2) a Collective Bargaining Agreement between the staffing
company, Regent (vessel operator), and a labor union. 175 The plaintiff
was not a signatory to the Collective Bargaining Agreement. However,
the Crew Agreement, signed by the plaintiff, incorporated the Collective
Bargaining Agreement by reference. Of critical importance, however, for
this case and others involving Seamen’s contracts calling for arbitration,
is that there was no one document—signed by all the parties—that
compelled arbitration of disputes. 176
Again, removal and demand for arbitration was based on the New
York Convention, which directs district courts to order arbitration when
certain prerequisites are met. 177 However, the Eleventh Circuit’s recent
decision in Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC v. Converteam SAS, 178
imposes an additional inquiry when the federal court’s jurisdiction is
challenged on a motion to remand. 179
The heart of the matter is the existence, vel non, of an arbitration
agreement signed by all parties. 180 The Eleventh Circuit in Outokumpu
made clear this is necessary for enforcement of arbitration provisions
under the New York Convention. 181 As summed up by the court in
Hodgson, “In other words, an arbitration agreement that has been signed
by the parties to the litigation must exist.” 182
Here, it is undisputed that the two documents cited in the notice of
removal (Crew Agreement and Collective Bargaining Agreement) were
not signed by all parties to the litigation. Recall, however, that the Crew
Agreement—signed by Plaintiff and the staffing company (a non-party)—
expressly incorporated the Collective Bargaining Agreement by
reference. The Collective Bargaining Agreement was signed by Regent
(vessel operator), the staffing company and a labor union, but not by the
Id. at *3.
Id. at *9–10.
177 Id. at *5–6 (citing Bautista v. Star Cruises, 396 F.3d 1289, 1294–95 (11th Cir. 2005)).
178 902 F.3d 1316, 1323 (11th Cir. 2018).
179 Hodgson, 2020 WL 6120478, at *6.
180 Id. at *14.
181 Id. at *13–14 (citing Outokumpu, 902 F.3d at 1325)). The Convention was quoted in
Outokumpu—and restated in Hodgson—in pertinent part:
[E]ach Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing under which
the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have
arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal
relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable of
settlement by arbitration.
182 Hodgson, 2020 WL 6120478, at *12.
175
176
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plaintiff. 183 As set out in Outokumpu, the New York Convention requires
“that the parties actually sign an agreement to arbitrate their disputes
in order to compel arbitration.” 184 There was no document compelling
arbitration that was actually signed by all parties. 185 Because the court
determined that arbitration was not appropriate under the New York
Convention or FAA, and lacking any other grounds to maintain federal
jurisdiction, the district court remanded Mr. Hodgson’s lawsuit back to
its original state court forum. 186
VI. FOREIGN JUDICIAL SALE OF VESSEL – EXTINGUISHED
LIENS
In World Fuel Services, Inc. v. M/V PARKGRACHT, 187 the district
court granted summary judgment based on a foreign judicial sale and
dismissed the putative lien holder’s claim against the vessel. 188 The
plaintiff delivered bunkers to the M/V PARKGRACHT. The bill remained
unpaid, and the plaintiff tracked the vessel with the hopes of arresting it
at some point. In January 2019, the vessel arrived in Malta. The plaintiff
learned of this, as well as the subsequent arrest of the vessel in Malta by
the bank holding a ship mortgage. The plaintiff did not intervene in the
Maltese litigation, although they consulted with a Maltese attorney,
which notified the plaintiff of the arrest. The vessel was sold by the
Maltese court, which issued a decree confirming the sale as providing free
and clear title to the buyer under Maltese law. 189
The vessel arrived in south Florida in October 2019. The plaintiff filed
a lawsuit seeking to foreclose its maritime lien based on the unpaid
bunker bill. 190 In opposing this effort, and moving for summary
judgment, the vessel’s new owner argued that the Maltese judicial sale
provided title free and clear of liens arising prior to the sale of vessel,
including the lien for bunkers claimed by plaintiff. 191
American courts will honor foreign judicial sales if the following
elements are demonstrated: (1) a foreign court of competent admiralty
jurisdiction ordered the sale; (2) the proceedings were “fair and regular;”
(3) the sale followed validly entered judgment after an in rem admiralty
Id. at *13.
Id. at *14 (quoting Outokumpu, 902 F.3d at 1326 (emphasis in original)).
185 Id. at *13.
186 Id. at *14–15.
187 489 F. Supp. 3d 1340 (S.D. Fla. 2020).
188 Id. at 1345.
189 Id. at 1343–46.
190 Id. at 1346 (citing 46 U.S.C. § 31342 (2021)).
191 World Fuel Services, Inc., 2020 WL 6481115 at *8.
183
184
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proceeding; and (4) the sale had the effect, under the law of the foreign
forum, of extinguish all pre-existing maritime liens. 192
The court first dismissed the lienholder’s effort to strike the affidavit
of a Maltese attorney proffered on behalf of the vessel owner. 193 It was
argued that the movant (vessel owner), pursuant to Rule 26, 194 failed to
identify the lawyer as an expert. Instead, the vessel owner argued that
the affidavit should be considered pursuant to Rule 44.1, 195 as a source
of information on foreign law. 196 The district court agreed, observing that
Rule 44.1 allowed the trial court to consider a broad range of evidence
pertaining to foreign law, as long as it was relevant and related to the
determination of the county’s law. 197
The affidavit of the Maltese lawyer clearly demonstrated that the
proceedings were in all respects proper, and in accord with Maltese
maritime law. Apparently, the ship owner, nonmoving party, did not
provide a counter affidavit to create an issue of fact, or at least a legal
issue with the sufficiency of the Maltese proceedings. 198
Even taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party, the court held there was no genuine issue of material fact and that
the lien claimant’s efforts to foreclose against the M/V PARKGRACHT
were due to be dismissed. 199
VII. DEATH ON THE HIGH SEAS ACT
The Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed that suits falling within the Death on
the High Seas Act (DOHSA), 200 do not require an independent maritime
nexus. 201 The case arises from the crash of a U.S. Air Force F-16 fighter
jet operated by Lt. Col. Matthew LaCourse, a retired Air Force pilot
employed as a civilian by the Department of Defense. While on a training
run over the Gulf of Mexico, Lt. Col. LaCourse’s F-16 crashed into the

192 Id. at *8–9 (citing and quoting Crescent Towing & Salvage Co., Inc. v. M/V ANAX, 40
F.3d 741, 744 (5th Cir. 1994)).
193 Id. at *12.
194 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2).
195 FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1. (“A party who intends to raise an issue about a foreign country’s
law must give notice by a pleading or other writing . . .”).
196 World Fuel Services, 2020 WL 6481115, at *11–12.
197 Id.
198 Id. at *12–13.
199 Id. at *4–5.
200 46 U.S.C. §§ 30301–08 (2021).
201 LaCourse v. PAE Worldwide Inc., 980 F.3d 1350, 1358, n.7 (11th Cir. 2020).
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Gulf of Mexico more than 12 nautical miles from shore. Lt. Col. LaCourse
was killed. 202
Maintenance on the jet was performed by PAE Worldwide, pursuant
to a contract with the United States Air Force. The pilot’s widow brought
an action against PAE in state court, alleging that PAE Worldwide failed
to properly maintain the aircraft’s systems and remove it from service
when potential problems were discovered. Suit was removed to federal
court based on federal question jurisdiction and other grounds. 203 The
specific focus of the instant decision was DOHSA, which states in
pertinent part: “[W]hen the death of an individual is caused by wrongful
act, neglect, or default occurring on the high seas . . . the personal
representative of the decedent may bring a civil action in admiralty
against the person or vessel responsible.” 204
As the court of appeals explained, DOHSA’s application brings with it
limits on recoverable damages. 205 Compensation is allowed only for
pecuniary losses, thereby eliminating recovery for emotional injury and
punitive damages. 206
The district court granted a series of motions to dismiss, and appeal to
the Eleventh Circuit followed. 207 Mrs. LaCourse initially argued that the
district court erred by holding DOHSA applied in the first place.
Specifically, because the wrongful act, neglect, or default occurred on
land—namely, alleged negligent maintenance of the aircraft—the plain
language of DOHSA weighed against the statute’s application. 208
The Supreme Court rejected this argument in an earlier case, Offshore
Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire. 209 Tallentire specifically held that, “admiralty
jurisdiction is expressly provided under DOHSA where the accidental
deaths occurred beyond a marine league from shore.” 210
The Eleventh Circuit’s predecessor circuit was even more blunt in its
recognition of this point. 211 Even though negligence occurs on land, as
long as the impact is felt on the high seas DOHSA will apply: “DOHSA
has been construed to confer admiralty jurisdiction over claims arising

Id. at 1352–53.
Id. at 1353–54.
204 Id. at 1355 (citing 46 U.S.C. § 30302)(2021).
205 Id. at 1355.
206 Id.
207 Id. at 1362.
208 Id. at 1355.
209 477 U.S. at 207 (cited in LaCourse, 980 F.3d at 1356).
210 Tallentire, 477 U.S. at 218.
211 Id. at 1356.
202
203
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out of airplane crashes on the high seas though the negligence alleged to
have caused the crash occurred on land.” 212
A concurring opinion written by Circuit Judge Newsom agreed that
DOHSA applied based on the jurisprudence cited. 213 But Judge
Newsom’s acquiescence came with him “holding my nose, as DOHSA’s
plain language is squarely to the contrary.” 214 Judge Newsom explained
that DOHSA jurisprudence is likely the result of an historical anomaly
in admiralty law, premised on the “consummation of the injury”
theory. 215 Essentially, this doctrine assesses maritime jurisdiction based
on the locality of the injury, versus where the underlying negligent act
occurred. 216
Appellant also suggested that the accident lacked a significant nexus
to a maritime activity, one of the hallmarks of maritime jurisdiction. 217
Unfortunately for the appellant, the Supreme Court of the United States
Executive Jet decision rejected the need for a maritime nexus when
DOHSA applies. 218 “In sum, then, we agree with the district court that
DOHSA doesn’t require a maritime nexus—and therefore, that because
(on the Supreme Court’s interpretation) the Act applies whenever a death
occurs on the high seas, it governs LaCourse’s wrongful-death suit.” 219
With the application of DOHSA, the statute provided the exclusive
remedy, preempting the plaintiff’s breach of warranty and breach of
contract claims brought under Florida law. 220
VIII. CRIMINAL – SEAMAN’S MANSLAUGHTER STATUTE
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Alvarez 221 involves
the interpretation and application of the “Seaman’s Manslaughter
Statute.” 222 The statute provides, in pertinent part:
212 In re Dearborn Marine Service, Inc., 499 F.2d 263, 272 (5th Cir. 1974) (cited and
quoted in LaCourse, 980 F.3d at 1363).
213 LaCourse, 980 F.3d at 1362 (Newsom, J. concurring).
214 Id.
215 Id. at 1364.
216 Id. (internal citations omitted).
217 Id. at 1356 (citing Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249
(1972)).
218 Id. at 1357.
219 Id. at 1358.
220 Id. The court also addressed a government contractor defense, holding that the
aircraft maintenance company satisfied the prerequisites for its application. This
essentially extends sovereign immunity to a private party operating pursuant to detailed
government instructions and contract terms. Id. at 1362.
221 809 F. App’x 562 (11th Cir. 2020).
222 18 U.S.C. § 1115 (2021).
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Every captain, engineer, pilot, or other person employed on any
steamboat or vessel, by whose misconduct, negligence, or inattention
to his duties on such vessel the life of any person is destroyed, and
every owner, charterer, inspector, or other public officer, through
whose fraud, neglect, connivance, misconduct, or violation of law the
life of any person is destroyed, shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than ten years, or both. 223

Defendant Mauricio Alvarez was operating a ninety-one foot
performance yacht, the MIAMI VICE, as an unlicensed captain engaging
in commercial charters for hire. 224 “For a commercial charter for hire to
be lawful, the captain of the charter must have taken a USCG-approved
captain's license course and must have an active USCG captain's
license.” 225 Despite never having taken a captain’s course, or having any
formal training in operating a vessel of this size, Mr. Alvarez served as
the charter captain on the MIAMI VICE “at least forty times between
October 2017 and the date of the accident [April 1, 2018].” 226
On April 1, 2018, a group of individuals charted the MIAMI VICE from
its owner, TM Yachting Charter LLC. Alvarez was acting as captain of
the vessel and operated the boat to Monument Island in Biscayne Bay.
Alvarez did not anchor the vessel, instead beaching the ninety-one-foot
yacht on Monument Island. He joined the passengers at the rear of the
vessel, and began swimming behind the yacht along with the group. At
some point, Alvarez returned to the helm, started the engines and
immediately began to back the boat off Monument Island. Unfortunately,
Alvarez failed to clear the area, post a lookout, or do anything which a
reasonably prudent vessel operator would do to make sure it was safe to
back the vessel into a waterway known to be occupied by swimmers.
Tragically, one of the passengers was caught in the propeller and
killed. 227
Alvarez was charged in one-count indictment under the Seaman's
Manslaughter Statute. He pled guilty, although he reserved his right to
take an appeal on certain matters, including the denial of his motion to
dismiss the statute as unconstitutionally vague for criminalizing simple
negligence. 228

Id.
Alvarez, 809 F. App’x. at 564.
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 Id. at 565.
228 Id. at 566.
223
224
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The Eleventh Circuit noted that only one federal court of appeals had
apparently addressed the mens rea requirement under the statute. 229 In
United States v. O'Keefe, 230 the Fifth Circuit had no trouble finding that
the unambiguous language of the Seaman's Manslaughter Statute could
not be stretched to imply the requirement of gross negligence; the court
concluded that Congress did not intend any heightened mens rea
requirement beyond negligence when it enacted the statute. 231
Apparently, there are no United States Supreme Court decisions on
point. The Eleventh Circuit reviewed other Supreme Court holdings
addressing the constitutionality of criminal statutes lacking a knowledge
element. 232 The developed jurisprudence makes clear that “if Congress
intends and expressly crafts a statute to reach negligent actions, then the
Due Process Clause does not bar it from doing so.” 233
This accident and ensuing criminal charges appear to be the result of
the private charter operations, which are now more prevalent through
the use of “sharing applications,” akin to the ridesharing platforms like
Uber and Lyft. These operations are on the United States Coast Guard’s
radar, primarily for the use of uninspected vessels and unlicensed
captains (like Mr. Alvarez). 234 The author tried unsuccessfully to
determine if any criminal charges were brought against the owner of the
MIAMI VICE, TM Yachting Charter LLC. The second part of the
Seaman's Manslaughter Statute would allow a corporation or a corporate
officer to be criminally charged for allowing a negligent act to cause a
fatal injury:
When the owner or charterer of any steamboat or vessel is a
corporation, any executive officer of such corporation, for the time
being actually charged with the control and management of the
operation, equipment, or navigation of such steamboat or vessel, who
has knowingly and willfully caused or allowed such fraud, neglect,
connivance, misconduct, or violation of law, by which the life of any
person is destroyed, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or or
imprisoned not more than ten years, or both. 235

Id. at 568 (citing United States v. O'Keefe, 426 F.3d 274, 279 (5th Cir. 2005)).
426 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 2005).
231 Id. at 279 (cited in Alvarez, 809 Fed.App’x at 568).
232 Alvarez, 809 F. App’x at 568–69.
233 Id. (citing United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 71 (1994)).
234
See “Illegal Charters: Don’t Step Aboard,” BOATU.S. (May 3, 2021)
www.Boatus.com/expert-advice/expert-advice-archive/2020/november/illegal-charters.
235 18 U.S.C. § 1115 (2021).
229
230
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The Eleventh Circuit discussed a number of prior events where the
Coast Guard cited Mr. Alvarez for operating the vessel illegally (and
without holding a USCG captain’s license). 236 One might assume the
corporate owners of the yacht knew or should have known of these
events. 237
IX. CUBAN LIBERTY AND DEMOCRATIC SOLIDARITY ACT OF 1996
Havana Docks Corporation sued Norwegian Cruise Lines in federal
court, seeking damages for the cruise lines’ use of dock facilities in
Havana confiscated by the Castro regime in 1960. 238 This lawsuit was
brought under the “Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of
1996,” also interchangeably referred to as the LIBERTAD Act, “Title III,”
or the Helms-Burton Act. 239 Essentially, the Helms-Burton Act was an
effort by the United States to address the wrongful confiscation of
property by the Cuban government, as well as its subsequent use by
third-parties—referred to as “trafficking” the confiscated property. 240 A
private right of action was created by the Helms-Burton Act, allowing
aggrieved parties to sue any person who “traffics” or uses for gain the
confiscated property. 241
In March 2017, Norwegian Cruise Lines, and other cruise line
operators, began calling on Cuban ports. The company used docks in
Havana formally owned by the Havana Docks Corporation or its
predecessor. Havana Docks sued under the Helms-Burton Act, seeking
economic damages based on Norwegian Cruise Lines use of confiscated
property. Norwegian Cruise Lines filed a motion to dismiss, raising three
issues: (1) lack of standing, (2) violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause, and
(3) a violation of the Due Process Clause, based on inadequate notice of
potential liability through the Helms-Burton Act’s retroactive
application. 242 The district court rejected these arguments, and allowed
the suit to proceed. 243
The threshold analysis of standing was addressed first. To establish
an actual case or controversy, standing must be demonstrated by
showing (1) an injury that is concrete and particularized, (2) causation
Alvarez, 809 F. App’x at 564–65.
See id. at 562.
238 Havana Docks Corp. v. Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings, Ltd., 484 F.Supp. 3d 1215
(S.D. Fla. 2020).
239 22 U.S.C. § 6021 (cited in Havana Docks Corp., 484 F.Supp. 3d at 1221).
240 Havana Docks Corp., 484 F.Supp. 3d at 1221.
241 Id. at 1222.
242 Id. at 1222–27.
243 Id. at 1236.
236
237
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linking the injury to the acts of the defendant, and (3) the ability to
redress the claimed harm. 244
The gist of the standing arguments focused on the lack of injury
sustained by Havana Docks caused by Norwegian Cruise Lines use of the
facilities in Cuba. Norwegian Cruise Lines argued, at bottom, that the
“injury” was the confiscation of the property by the Cuban government,
and not the use of the facility by cruise lines many years later. 245 The
court rejected this argument, noting that while the injury may have had
its origin in the confiscation, Norwegian Cruise Line’s use of the stolen
property (namely, trafficking in the property) suffices as an injury in fact:
“Stated otherwise, Havana Docks’ injury is ‘real’ because it is not
receiving the benefit of its interest in the Subject Property and NCL's
subsequent trafficking in the confiscated property has undermined
Plaintiff's right to compensation for that expropriation.” 246
The other elements of causation and redressability were likewise
disposed of in fairly abbreviated fashion. 247 As explained by the court,
“[i]n enacting Title III, Congress recognized that there exists a causal
link between a claimant's injury from the Cuban Government's
expropriation of their property and a subsequent trafficker's unjust
enrichment from its use of that confiscated property.” 248 This was
sufficient to demonstrate causation; Norwegian Cruise Lines’ conduct
and profiting from use of the Havana Docks was traceable to the
plaintiff’s claimed injury. 249
Redressability simply required a showing that relief can be gained by
a favorable decision. 250 Norwegian Cruise Lines argued that Havana
Docks would not regain its confiscated property by a decision in the
instant case. 251 The court held that economic damages would be
appropriate compensation for the claims asserted by Havana Docks, and
the inability to restore the property to its rightful owner did not preclude
a claim. 252
Turning to the Ex Post Facto Clause, the court noted that the central
concern of this constitutional protection was “lack of fair notice and

244 Id. at 1231–33 (citing inter alia Kelly v. Harris, 331 F.3d 817, 819–20 (11th Cir.
2003)).
245 Id. at 1234–37.
246 Id. at 1228.
247 Id. at 1229–31.
248 Id. at 1230.
249 Id. at 1230.
250 Id. at 1231.
251 Id.
252 Id.
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governmental restraint when the legislature increases punishment
beyond what was prescribed when the crime was consummated.” 253 The
Ex Post Facto argument—as well as the due process analysis—turns on
the fact that the civil action provisions of the Helms-Burton Act were
suspended immediately after enactment of the statute in August of
1996. 254 The suspensions, running for six months, had been consecutively
renewed by presidents since that time. 255 In May 2019, the Trump
administration announced it would discontinue suspensions and allow
the civil actions to be filed. 256 The court made a clear distinction between
the effective date of the Act and the discontinuation of the suspension of
civil actions. 257 “[L]iability for trafficking thus attached to conduct on
confiscated property beginning on November 1, 1996,” (i.e., three months
after Title III's effective date). 258 The potential liability for trafficking
likewise remained unchanged since the effective date, “thus putting
traffickers on notice of their potential liability . . . since Title III took
effect in 1996.” 259
Interestingly, the court did not give much weight to the cruise line’s
argument that it was acting pursuant to (i) government license to sail
into Cuban ports, as well (ii) the encouragement of the Obama
administration to expand relations and commercial activity with Cuba,
including tourism and cruise line operations. 260 The court stated that this
encouragement “does not in any way absolve NCL of its obligations to
also comply with federal law—namely, by not trafficking in confiscated
property without the consent of a claimant.” 261
X. LHWCA CLAIMS
In a case of apparent first impression within the Eleventh Circuit, the
court held that a ship owner does not breach its “turnover” duty where
the plaintiff is injured by an open and obvious hazard. 262 Anthony
Troutman was a longshoreman engaged in loading the M/V SEABOARD
253 Id. at 1232 (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 30, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d
17 (1981)).
254 Id.
255 Id. at 1222.
256 Id.
257 Id. at 1235–36.
258 Id. at 1235 (citing 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(1)(A)).
259 Id. at 1236.
260 Id. at 1236–37.
261 Id. at 1237–38. Plaintiff sent NCL a letter in February 2019 advising of a potential
claim under the Helms–Burton Act. There is no discussion about NCL’s response to this
letter or negotiations (if any) with Havana Docks before suit was filed. Id. at 1224.
262 Troutman v. Seaboard Atlantic Ltd., 958 F.3d 1143, 1146 (11th Cir. 2020).
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ATLANTIC. This work required Mr. Troutman to traverse an elevated
walkway; in the past, the walkway was occasionally fenced off by a rope
line. At other times, the elevation of the walkway presented no hazard
since the containers could be loaded to a level equal to the walkway
itself. 263
On the day in question, however, there was no rope fencing, nor was
the cargo high enough to alleviate the risk (walking at heights). Mr.
Troutman stumbled, and fell to the deck below, sustaining serious
injuries. 264
Suit was filed against the vessel owner pursuant to certain provisions
of the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. 265 The district
court granted summary judgment, holding that Mr. Troutman was
unable to succeed on his claim that the vessel violated its “turnover
duty”—an obligation to deliver a ship that is reasonably safe for work—
because the elevated walkway presented an open and obvious hazard. 266
The jurisprudence which defines the duties owed by a vessel owner to
a longshoreman or other workers aboard a vessel is well established. 267
Under 33 U.S.C. § 905(b), the vessel owner owes the longshoreman (or
other worker aboard the vessel) three general duties: (1) turnover duties,
(2) to exercise reasonable care in areas where the vessel crew remains in
active control, (3) to intervene under certain, albeit limited,
circumstances. 268 The turnover duties consist of two related
obligations. 269 First, the ship owner must exercise ordinary care under
the circumstances to deliver the ship and its appurtenant equipment in
such a condition that a competent stevedore can safely carry out its
work. 270 The second and corresponding obligation is a duty to warn; if the
ship owner knows of a danger hidden from the longshoreman or his
employer (the stevedoring company), it must warn of such issue. 271

Id. at 1144–45.
Id. at 1145.
265 Id. at 1144. See Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (“LHWCA”), 33
U.S.C. §§ 901–05 (2021). Specifically, 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) allows an injured worker to bring
suit against a vessel, its owners and operators, for injuries “caused by the negligence of a
vessel.”
266 Troutman, 958 F.3d at 1145.
267 Id. at 1148.
268 Id. at 1146 (citing inter alia Kirksey v. Tonghai Maritime, 535 F.3d 388, 391 (5th Cir.
2008)).
269 Id. at 1146.
270 Id.
271 Id. at 1146–47 (internal citations omitted).
263
264
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The instant case turned on the application of the turnover duty. 272 The
district court held that a reasonably competent and experienced
stevedore could safely work with full recognition of the dangers presented
by an elevated walkway. 273 The Eleventh Circuit agreed. 274 One of the
overriding principles of the LHWCA is that the stevedoring company has
primary responsibility for the safety of is workers. 275 Likewise, the
LHWCA assumes that the vessel is entitled to rely on the stevedoring
company to perform its tasks without supervision or intervention by
vessel personnel. 276 The Eleventh Circuit held that a general rule exists
that the “open-and-obvious defense” is applicable to defeat a claim
premised on breach of the turnover duty. 277 To hold otherwise would run
contrary to the underpinnings of the LHWCA: “For example, ship owners
could no longer rely on the expertise and experience of the stevedoring
company or longshoremen to deal with hazards that may arise.” 278
Likewise, the position advanced by Mr. Troutman would effectively
impose strict liability, requiring a ship owner to turn over an “absolutely
safe vessel, a duty which the LHWCA does not impose.” 279
Because the elevated and exposed walkway was an obvious hazard
that the plaintiff could have avoided with the exercise of reasonable care,
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of his claims
against the vessel interests. 280

Id. at 1147.
Id.
274 Id. at 1148.
275 Id. at 1147.
276 Id.
277 Id.
278 Id. at 1148.
279 Id.
280 Id.
272
273

